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Rejection of the power of judicial review in
Britain
Kenneth J. Arenson*
1. Introduction
Many in Britain and elsewhere have questioned the democratic
legitimacy of the power of judicial review. In particular, they have
raised a question as to the compatibility of this power, and its
results, with certain values which many believe to be an integral
component of most modem societies. The discussion to follow will
address the concerns of those who share this view, especially those in
Britain.
In assessing whether the power of judicial review is compatible
with 'certain values which many believe to be an integral component
of most modern societies,' it is appropriate to begin by ascertaining
exactly what those values are. The tenor of the topic for discussion
appears to envisage the notion that true democracy and
majoritarianism are not only synonymous, but considered essential in
modern societies. But if that is so, how does one explain the fact that
judicial review is endemic in much of the modern industrialized world
including Canada,' the United States, ' Germany,3 and to some extent
France-to mention only a few? All of these countries would
characterise themselves as democratic, yet all have entrusted the final
word on constitutional matters to a judiciary which lacks electoral
accountability It is therefore logical to conclude that either true
* Lecturer in Law, Deakin University.
1 Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen (1988) 44 DLR 385.
2 Roe v. Wade 410 US 113 (1973); Marbury v. Madison 5 US 137
(1803).
3 Denninger, E., 'Judicial Review Revisited: The German Experience'
(1985) 59 Tulane L Rev 1013; Kommers, D.P. Judicial Politics in
West Germany, chs 1-6.
4 Cummins, R.J. 'The General Principles of Law, Separation of Powers
and Theories of Judicial Decision in France' (1986) 35 ICLQ 594;
Beardsley, 'Constitutional Review in France' (1985) Supreme Court
Review 189.
5 Kommers, fn. 3 at chs 1-3; Abraham, H.J. 1975, The Judicial
Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United
States, England, and France, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press,
London, 295-371; Strayer, B.L. 1968, Judicial Review of
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democracy does not exist in these countries, or that its existence is
compatible with, if not dependent upon, the notion of review by an
independent judiciary. The balance of this paper will be devoted to
demonstrating that the latter conclusion best accounts for the endemic
support that judicial review has received in most modem societies.
More succinctly stated, this paper will demonstrate that true
democracy and majoritarianism are anything but synonymous. Once
this has been accomplished, the democratic legitimacy of judicial
review will become evident.
2. Majoritadanism
To equate true democracy with majoritarianism, one must be prepared
to settle on a definition of what majoritarian government is. In a
purist sense, majoritarianism denotes a system in which all
governmental actions are carried out by elected officials in accordance
with the wishes of a majority of their constituents. But how would
such a system be implemented? One possibility would be to submit
all governmental decisions to the electorate for direct approval by
referendum. It is unnecessary to further protract this discussion in
order to expose the absurdity of such an idea. The sheer number and
complexity of governmental decisions would make it impractical, if
not impossible, to submit them all to the electorate. Moreover, when
it comes to specialized matters such as law reform, banking and trade
practices, it is unrealistic to expect that the average citizen will have
the expertise to make informed decisions. In addition, to implement
such a system would effectively transform government officials into
mindless executives whose sole function would be that of
implementing the results of the various referenda. Therefore, unless a
different meaning can be ascribed to "majoritarian government," it is
clear that no such thing exists in the modem world-at least in the
purist sense.
There are many who would argue that notwithstanding the
aforementioned factors, majoritarian government can and does exist in
a more pragmatic form; that is, it exists in form of representative
democracy whereby laws are enacted by elected officials who are
accountable to their respective constituencies. But does the fact of
eventual electoral accountability really ensure that the government
will carry out the wishes of a majority of the electorate? I think not.
What it does ensure is that if elected officials fail to carry out the
Legislation in Canada, chs 1-2; Bakan, J.C., 'Constitutional
Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in Canadian
Constitutional Thought' (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall LJ 123.
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wishes of their constituents, a day will eventually come when they
may be voted out of office and replaced by others who may or may
not prove to be equally disappointing. Indeed, the fact that
governments and elected representatives are often voted out of office
serves as a clear reminder that pragmatic majoritarian government
bears little resemblance to majoritarianism in its purist form.
Moreover, it is doubtful that the electorates of the modem
industrialized world would support the notion that elected
representatives should be stripped of conscience and independent
judgment in making decisions. In addition, it is impractical to expect
that any elected representative could tailor every decision to satisfy a
majority of his constituents. Yet the fact that re-election of
incumbents is more the rule than the exception demonstrates that
elected representatives are judged on their record as a whole-not on
the notion that they are always expected to act in acconlance with a
majority of their constituents. Therefore, in assessing whether
judicial review is compatible with certain values which many believe
to be an integral component of most modem societies-it is clear
that total comnitment to majoritarian principles is not among those
values. Equally clear is the fact that some degree of tolerance for
anti-majoritarian principles is prevalent in most modem societies.
Nothing could better buttress this point than the acceptance of the
institution of judicial review in most of these societies. Therefore, it
is logical to assume that the institution of judicial review is a
manifestation of some value or values that are viewed as essential in
a democratic society. To what value or values is it attributable?
There is always a tendency to assume that democracy and
individual liberty go hand in hand; that is, the attainment of the
former will result in the protection of the latter.' Stated differently,
there is a popular belief that a government which emanates from the
people needs very few limitations placed upon it, because its rules are
identified with the people and should therefore coincide with the
interests and will of the nation as a whole.7 While it is true that the
concept of majority rule theoretically ensures that those who are
aggrieved by society's rules will constitute a minority, it is also true
that majority rule poses the risk that the rights of minorities will be
abused.! Indeed, if absolute majority rule were to govern, there would
be nothing, save for racial tolerance and common decency, to prevent
a predominantly caucasian electorate from prohibiting all
6 O'Hagan, T. 1984, The End of Law?, Basil Blackwell Publishers,
Oxford, 116-157.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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non-caucasians from voting in local elections. I dare say that few
proponents of democracy would be in favor of carrying majority rule
to such an extreme. Therefore, just as there are pragmatic
considerations which militate in favor of majoritarian government, so
too are there pragmatic reasons for restricting its powers. The
institution of judicial review is simply a manifestation of the fact
that societies value certain principles too highly to entrust them to
the will of a simple majority of the electorate; judicial review
amounts to an expression that while a democratic society accords a
high priority to the notion of majoritarian rule, it accords an even
higher priority to the protection of certain principles-regardless of
whether the particular beneficiaries happen to be in the mainstream of
public opinion. If certain principles are to be protected from
majoritarian rule, it follows that the responsibility must devolve on
some person or body with the requisite independence from political
pressure. Independence from political pressure requires freedom from
electoral accountability, and an independent judiciary has been the
choice of most modern societies.
In the context of this discussion, the power of judicial review
means the power of a court to invalidate an act of the legislature.9
This necessarily entails the existence of a higher body of law which
overrides ordinary legislation in cases of conflict. In most modern
societies, this higher law exists in the form of a written constitution
which declares its supremacy over all other laws."0 In this context,
supremacy denotes a body of law which is not only supreme in its
overriding effect on other law, but supreme in the sense that it enjoys
a more permanent status than other law since it cannot be amended or
repealed through the ordinary legislative process." Rather, the written
constitution usually provides that it can only be amended through an
arduous process that is designed to make it resistant to the temporal
whims of the electorate-either by amendment requiring ratification
by public referendum, a super-majority of the States or the national
legislature, or both. 2 Therefore, the written constitution is, at least
in this sense, an anti-majoritarian document.
9 Abraham, fn. 5 at 295-371.
10 The Constitution of the United States of America, art. VI, s. 2; see
fn. 5.
11 Munro, C.R. 1987, Studies in Constitutional Law, Butterworths,
London, 4-7.
12 Blaustein, A.P. & Flanz, G.H. (eds) 1971, Constitutions of the
Countries of the World, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry; The
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Thus, it is apparent that most modem societies conceive of
democracy in majoritarian terms, tempered by anti-majoritarian
institutions which are designed to curb the excesses that are a natural
by-product of majoritarian rule; these institutions are the written
constitution and an independent judiciary entrusted with the primary
responsibility of safeguarding its supremacy. Since the notions of
majoritarian rule and the need for anti-majoritarian institutions to
curb its excesses both derive from considerations of pragmatism,
there is no apparent reason why the former should be viewed as any
more legitimate than the latter. The fact that most modem societies
deem both to be essential components of democracy is reason enough
to reject the argument that judicial review is bereft of democratic
legitimacy. In any event, the foregoing only serves to demonstrate
that the term "democratic.' does not lend itself to precise definition.
Lacking any universal definition, it becomes all the more difficult to
assert that judicial review is devoid of democratic legitimacy; that is,
unless one is prepared to claim that they enjoy a monopoly on the
truth.
3. Democracy in Britain and the United States
On the other hand, there is one country in the modem western world,
namely Britain, whose system of democracy does not include the
institutions of the written constitution and the power of judicial
review. 3 This only serves to underscore the point that the meaning
of "democracy" is largely in the eyes of the beholder. The question to
be addressed, therefore, is whether the absence of these institutions
can be attributed to a widespread belief that they lack democratic
legitimacy.
As noted above, in the United Kingdom there is no document or
collection of documents constituting a supreme law in the nature of a
written constitution. On the contrary, there is a deeply entrenched
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty which places no restrictions on
the authority of Parliament to enact legislation as it sees fit."
Indeed, it is the very essence of this doctrine that courts must obey
Acts of Parliament."
Constitution of the United States of America, art. V; Basic Law of
the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 144; The French Constitution,
art. 89; The Constitution of the Republic of Italy, art. 138; The
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s. 128.
13 Munro, fn. I1 at 4-7, 71-108.
14 Id at 71-108.
15 Ibid.
42 Deakin Law Review
Though the Crown is the titular head of State, it would be an
understatement to point out that it no longer functions as the
executive branch of government. Indeed, whatever remains of the
Royal prerogative does so by the grace of Parliament which has the
power to erode or even eliminate its last vestiges."' Instead, the
executive branch of the government consists of the Prime Minister
and the cabinet ministers that he or she appoints from within the
ranks of his or her political party. By convention, the Crown
designates a person to act as Prime Minister who can command a
majority of the members of the House of Commons.'7 Given that
Britain essentially operates under a two-party system, that person
will normally be the leader of the party which has a clear majority in
the Commons." Normally, the Prime Minister and the other cabinet
ministers are Members of Parliament, usually the House of
Commons. Therefore, the executive issues from the legislature and
there is a considerable co-mingling of the two branches." Through
Britain's strong tradition of party loyalty, enforced by the threat of
withdrawal of the Party Whip and in some cases the threat of
dissolution of Parliament, the executive is normally able to exploit
its majority in the Commons to secure passage of its legislative
initiatives."
The House of Commons, which consists of elected
representatives, is only one of the two Houses of Parliament." The
other, the House of Lords, is comprised of members who are
essentially appointed for life with total freedom from electoral
accountability." Though it was once true that the assent of both
Houses was necessary in order for legislation to reach the statute
books, this was changed by the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949.23
These Acts provide that "finance bills" and other public bills (except
bills to extend the life of Parliament beyond five years) passed by the
16 Id at 159-182.
17 Id at 36-37.
18 Ibid; Jennings, W.I. 1957, Parliament, 2nd edn, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 13-58.
19 Duchacek, I.D. 1973, Power Maps: Comparative Politics of
Constitutions, Publishers Press, California, 141-210.
20 Jennings, fn. 18 at 13-56.
21 Ibid.
22 Id at 381-453; Horton, P. (ed.) 1985, Parliament In The 1980's,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, chs 5 & 7.
23 Wade, E.C.S. & Bradley, A.W. 1985, Constitutional and
Administrative Law, 4th edn, Longman, London & New York,
177-209.
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Commons will become law if the House of Lords refuses to give its
assent within a specified perild of time." Therefore, the will of
Parliament's elected body can no longer be overcome by the House of
Lords--it can merely be delayed for a relatively brief period of time.
Given the diminished legislative veto of the House of Lords,
Britain's strong two-party system, and the tradition of party loyalty
which enables the government to exploit that two-party system,
where are the safeguards to curb the excesses that are associated with
majoritarian rule? The answer lies in the fact that Britain's concept of
democracy, despite protestations to the contrary, is even more
removed from the purist notion of majoritarian rule than those of
other modern societies. In point of fact, it has its own special brand
of anti-majoritarian institutions which serve to check the abuses that
attend majoritarian rule. Therefore, the absence of a written
constitution and the power of judicial review cannot fairly be regarded
as a manifestation of an intrinsic hostility to anti-majoritarian
institutions; rather, it is a manifestation of Britain's preference and
long tradition of utilising other anti-majoritarian devices to temper
the abuses of majority rule.
As noted earlier, Britain's tolerance for anti-majoritarian
institutions within the overall framework of democracy dates back to
the early part of this century and prior thereto, before the Parliament
Act of 1911. In that era, the conservative, non-elected and elitist
members of the House of Lords could veto measures passed by the
Commons and thereby frustrate, at least in theory, the will of the
British electorate.' Though the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949
have addressed this problem in large measure, the fact of the House of
Lords' continued power to delay important legislation-not to
mention its very existence-is an indication of Britain's willingness
to tolerate anti-majoritarian institutions. This willingness can be
attributed, at least in part, to the recognition that a non-elective body
can serve as a moderating influence on the excesses of those who are
subject to electoral accountability.2'6
Another example of Britain's tolerance for anti-majoritarian
devices can be found in the terms of the Parliament Acts themselves.
Any bill seeking to extend the life of Parliament beyond the five year
maximum currently prescribed by law is expressly exempted from the
Acts." Therefore, any such bill must receive the assent of the House
of Lords in order to be duly enacted. The obvious intent of this
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid; Jennings, fn. 18 at 402-430.
26 Wade & Bradley, fn. 23.
27 Ibid.
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exemption is to prevent the Commons, in reality the government,
from passing legislation that would delay indefinitely its
accountability to the electorate. While the exemption is certainly
majoritarian in spirit, it also amounts to a recognition that elected
representatives are prone to abuse their authority. It is significant that
a nation which prides itself on the strongest commitment to
majoritarian principles has entrusted the House of Lords with the
responsibility of curbing one of the most sinister abuses of the only
representative body of Parliament.
The foregoing is an example of one type of flaw in representative
democracy-where elected officials accord a higher priority to their
own self-interests than those of their constituents. An equally
insidious flaw lies in the potential for majorities to abuse the rights
of minorities, as in the example of establishing a national religion.
Another classical example is the tendency of an emotionally charged
electorate to demand immediate legislation in reaction to a
particularly heinous crime such as child molestation. This occurred in
the recent McMartin pre-school case of alleged child molestation in
California. In the midst of hundreds of charges of child molestation,
none of which resulted in convictions, there was massive public
pressure to limit the right of an accused to cross-examine an alleged
victim of child abuse. Although well-intentioned, such legislation
would have seriously jeopardised the right to a fair trial. In that
instance, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution prevented an atmosphere of mass hysteria from having
this effect." If a situation such as this were to arise in Britain, what
besides the House of Lords and its limited veto, would prevent the
House of Commons from caving in to severe political pressure?
On the other hand, as noted above, the party in power can delay a
General Election for up to five years. If such a sensitive issue were
to arise three or four years before a General Election was mandated,
there is probably a greater chance that Members of Parliament would
be willing to resist this type of political pressure. Voters can have
short memories and after passions have subsided, cool reflection can
sometimes bring about a change of heart. In addition, the electorate
will normally judge political parties and elected officials on their
28 The Constitution of the United States of America Amendment VI
provides: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ...'. This
has been construed to guarantee the accused, among other things,
the opportunity to face his accusers in court and cross-examine them
effectively. Davis v. Alaska 415 US 308 (1974); Smith v. Illinois
390 US 129 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama 380 US 415 (1965).
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entire record and not on one particular issue. To the extent that the
foregoing generalizations hold true in any given situation, it seems
fair to describe the government's prerogative to delay a General
Election as yet another anti-majoritarian device for curbing the
excesses of majority rule. Indeed, a government's decision to
postpone electoral accountability can be seen as an admission that the
electorate is disaffected with its policies, at least for the time being.
In addition, the power of the government to enforce party loyalty
through threats of withdrawal of the Whip and dissolution can be a
powerful weapon in combating severe political pressure for
ill-advised legislation. Given the strength of the two-party system,
any decertified Member of Parliament seeking reselection would face
formidable odds. Members of Parliament are also aware that excessive
party disloyalty could trigger the government's resignation and a
dissolution of Parliament, thereby forcing all Members of Parliament
to face the electorate in a General Election. Thus, while members of
the Commons are eventually accountable to their constituents, they
are perhaps more accountable to the will of their party's leadership.29
While maintaining a higher allegiance to party leadership is highly
anti-majoritarian, it can serve as an effective device for resisting
political pressure to enact poor legislation.
Of course, the anti-majoritarian prerogative to postpone electoral
accountability can also be highly destructive to the workings of
representative government. On matters affecting the entire electorate
and not merely a small minority, governments often stray from the
policies that won them favor with the electorate. At other times,
governments will undertake new initiatives such as the community
charge, for example, which are vehemently opposed by a clear
majority of the voters. In instances such as these, the prerogative to
delay electoral accountability for years is tantamount to making a
mockery of the notion of representative democracy. Indeed, a highly
unpopular government can remain in power indefinitely, patently
against the wishes of the British electorate."° What makes this
particularly insidious is that Britain's two-party system and strong
tradition of party discipline will normally permit such an unpopular
government to impose its will until the next General Election.
29 Jennings, fn. 18 at 13-58.
30 Since the government normally enjoys a clear majority in the
Commons, its ability to coerce party loyalty also makes the
prospect of losing a "no confidence motion" very unlikely.
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While it is true, for example, that an American President and the
members of Congress are elected for fixed terms in office,3' it is also
true that America's political system is such that the party in control
of the presidency does not necessarily control the Congress. In fact,
the Republican Party has controlled the White House for twenty out
of the last twenty-eight years. During those twenty years, however,
the Republicans have never had a majority in both Houses of
Congress--and usually the Democrats have enjoyed a majority in
both. Moreover, party loyalty and discipline in the United States are
considerably weaker than in Britain. Congressmen and Senators are
notorious for flouting the party line in the interest of political
expedience. This is only natural, since party loyalty in the United
States cannot be enforced by the threats of dissolution or withdrawal
of the Party Whip; the former is simply an impossibility under the
American Constitution and the latter, while theoretically possible, is
hardly ever practiced.
Another major reason why party loyalty is weaker in the United
States is that the President is independently elected as opposed to
being nominated as the person who can command the support of a
majority of the members of Congress. 2 Unlike the situation in
Britain, therefore, a vote for a Congressman or Senator is not, in
reality, a vote for a particular party, its policies, and its leader to
become President.
Another important factor in the American political system is that
analogous to the House of Commons, no legislation can become law
without the assent of the House of Representatives." This is crucial
when one considers that Members of the House serve two-year terms
in office." This guarantees that those who flout the wishes of their
constituents will be held accountable within a relatively short time.
While the President and Senators serve terms of four and six years
respectively, 3 neither can legislate without the approval of the
House.3 Thus, the bi-annual Congressional elections permit the
electorate to exercise some degree of control over the President ad
Senate during the years when they are not directly accountable to the
people.
31 The Constitution of the United States of America, art. I, ss. 2-3 &
art. II, s. 1(1).
32 Id at art. II, ss. 1-3.
33 Id at art. I, s. 7(2).
34 Id at art. I, s. 2(1).
35 Id at art. I, s. 3(1) & art. 2, ss. 1-3.
36 Id at art. I, s. 7(2).
Rejection of the power of judicial review in Britain 47
This is not to suggest that the American system has been a
paragon of success in ensuring the efficacy of representative
government. In fact, it has been far from it. What it does suggest is
that there are certain features of the British system of representative
government that are anti-majoritarian in nature. In the assessment of
this observer, some of these features inure to the benefit of effective
representative government and others do not. Regardless of whether
they are perceived as a boon to democracy, their presence militates
strongly against the notion that Britain has rejected the institution of
judicial review because of an intrinsic distaste for anti-majoritarian
institutions. The final question to be addressed, therefore, is why
Britain has resisted the institution of judicial review as a means of
moderating the excesses of majoritarian rule.
One very popular explanation is that the British people are
reluctant to trust non-elected officials with what amounts to a
super-legislative power." Though the topic of judicial restraint has
37 Zander, M. 1985, A Bill of Rights?, 3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 26-90; Goodman, F., 'Mark Tushnet on Liberal
Constitutional Theory: Mission Impossible' (1989) 137 U
Pennyslvania L Rev 2259; Miller, A. S. & Howell, R. F., 'The Myth
of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication' (1960) 27 U Chic L
Rev 661. Britain is a signatory to the European Convention on
Human Rights: Finnie, W., 'The ECHR: Domestic Status' (1980) 2
JLS 434. Although it is true that under art. 15, signatories may
derogate from their obligations under certain circumstances, art. 53
provides that the signatories must abide by decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights in any case to which they are
parties. Further, art. 50 provides that if the Court finds that a
measure taken by a signatory is in conflict with its obligations
under the Convention, it shall afford any necessary and just
satisfaction to the injured party. It is also noteworthy that under art.
39, the judges on the Court are elected 'by a majority of votes cast
from a list of persons nominated by the Members of the Council of
Europe.' Therefore, the British electorate has very little influence
over the selection of judges. Thus, to the extent of its obligations as
a signatory to the Convention, Britain's Executive Branch has
assented to the notion of judicial review. Parliament, however, has
yet to incorporate the ECHR into Britain's domestic law: Finnie,
ibid. While this may be viewed by some as an indication of the
British electorate's reluctance to trust judges, it is significant that
Parliament has declined to invoke its sovereignty to withdraw from
the Convention. Thus, there is nothing to prevent a British subject
from seeking judicial review in the European Court of Human Rights
once he has exhausted his remedies under domestic law; ECHR, arts
25 & 26; Brogan v. United Kingdom (1988) 11 EHRR 117.
48 Deakin Law Review
captured the imagination of many prominent statesmen and legal
scholars,3 it is difficult to dispute the fact that any supreme law
which serves as a basis for judicial review is susceptible to differing
interpretations. It is doubtful whether any written constitution, for
example, was or could be designed to provide absolute guiding
principles for the resolution of all disputes. Therefore, constitutional
interpretation necessarily entails the task of balancing competing
interests, and it is only realistic to conclude that judges are guided by
their own value preferences in this balancing process. In the final
analysis, a constitution is really nothing more than an expression of
the values of an effective majority of justices who construe it at any
given time. Thus, the argument follows, the power of judicial review
is often tantamount to the power of a super-legislature.
While there is considerable force in this reasoning, how can it be
reconciled with Britain's penchant for exporting written constitutions
and the power of judicial review to many of its former colonies? Was
it Britain's intention to deliberately burden its former colonies with
an inherently flawed system of democracy? If not, can the absence of
judicial review be explained as a particular lack of trust in English
judges? This appears rather unlikely. Probably the best explanation
is one of traditional abstinence and a strong consensus among the
British electorate that Britain's brand of democracy has been quite
successful without it. For the sake of analysis, however, let us return
to the argument that a power of judicial review is often tantamount
to a power to act as a super-legislature.
If it is true that a constitution is really nothing more than an
expression of an effective majority of justices who construe it at any
given time, then it is equally true that it could not provide an
effective safeguard against majoritarian abuse if judges were subjected
to electoral accountability. If Judges were elected by popular vote or
removable by the other branches of government for making
unpopular decisions, what would be the likely impact on the efficacy
of judicial review in checking majoritarian abuses? Although the
answer is far from obvious in every instance, there is too great a risk
that the constitution would be transformed into a mirror image of
what the judiciary perceives as the clear public consensus of the day.
While one cannot discount the effect of public opinion on even the
most independent of judiciaries, an emasculation of judicial
independence can only exacerbate these tendencies. Therefore, if the
institution of judicial review is to maintain any semblance of efficacy
in checking the potential abuses of majoritarian government, an
38 Abraham, fn. 5 at 295-371.
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independent judiciary is absolutely essential. Such independence does,
however, result in a tendency to act as a super-legislature. But there
are methods of maintaining an independent judiciary and, at the same
time, confining its proclivity to act as a super-legislature within
acceptable limits. One such method is expressed in Article III, s. 2 of
the United States Constitution:
In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls ... the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned, the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction ... with
such exceptions, and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make.39
In Ex Pane McCarde, "° the Supreme Court literally construed this
language as granting Congress the power to determine the types of
cases in which the Supreme Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction.
While Ex Pane McCardle upheld an Act of Congress which abolished
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over cases involving
habeas corpus petitions, no other result-oriented restrictions on the
Court's appellate jurisdiction have since been enacted." Significantly,
Ex Parle McCardle was decided in the post-Civil War Reconstruction
Era (1868). On a few occasions, however, bills have been introduced
seeking to overturn unpopular Supreme Court decisions by stripping
the Court of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the issues
in controversy."' In 1979, for example, Senator Jesse Helms
proposed an amendment to a bill that would have deprived the entire
federal judiciary of any power to review state laws relating to
voluntary prayer in public schools. 3 This proposal, which was
defeated in committee, was a response by the "religious right" to
several Supreme Court decisions holding various forms of voluntary
prayer in public schools to be violative of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."
39 The Constitution of the United States of America, art. IU, s. 2. It
should be pointed out that under art. III, s. 1, lower federal courts
exist at the behest of Congress. Moreover, this section has been
construed as granting Congress the power to limit the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts as it sees fit. Hart, H. & Wechsler, H. 1973
Federal Courts, 2nd edn, The Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1-37.
40 Ex Parte McCardle, 74 US 506 (1868).
41 Barrett, E.L. & Cohen, W. 1985, Constitutional Law: Cases and
Materials, 7th edn, The Foundation Press, New York, 41.
42 Id at 41-42.
43 Id at 42.
44 Ibid.
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The fact that Congress has declined to tamper with the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction for more than a hundred years ' speaks
volumes concerning the charge that it has arrogated unto itself the
power of a super-legislature. If the Court has autocratically flouted
basic American values as many claim, why hasn't the Congress,
consisting of two representative bodies, expressed the will of the
American electorate by invoking its power under Article HI? It is
noteworthy that not a single bill of the type proposed by Senator
Helms has received the assent of either House since Ex Pante
McCardle was decided in 1868. Whether or not the constitutional
framers so intended, the effect of Congress' power under Article IIT
has been a moderating influence on both the Court and the Congress.
In particular, it has allowed the judiciary to maintain its independence
while confining its proclivity to act as a super-legislature within
acceptable limits. If the Court were to stray too far from the
mainstream of American thinking, the pressure for Congress to act
could become irresistible. If Congress were to strip the Court of its
appellate jurisdiction, especially its jurisdiction to review state court
decisions, the Constitution would no longer fulfil its function of
binding the states together as one national union under one supreme
law."' Indeed, without appellate jurisdiction to review state court
decisions, the Constitution would no longer have one meaning, but
several."' For obvious reasons, neither the Court nor Congress would
be anxious to provoke a constitutional crisis of this magnitude.
Thus, the mere existence of Congressional power under Article III
has added an element of self-restraint to both branches of government.
Another nightmare scenario emanating from Article III is the
possibility that the Court would declare unconstitutional any attempt
by the Congress to significantly limit its appellate jurisdiction. In
that event, a famous quotation from then President Andrew Jackson
is apposite: 'The Court has made its decision. Now let's see them
enforce it.' In the event that the Court so incensed the electorate that
Congress were to pass such a bill and the President were to sign it, it
is entirely possible that the executive would refuse to enforce the
Court's decision. If this were to happen, the principle of separation of
powers would crumble and along with it the entire constitutional
45 Id at 41.
46 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 US 304 (1816) (upholding the
constitutional authority of the United States Supreme Court to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over State Court decisions). Justice
Story's opinion for the Court speaks of the far reaching
implications of holding otherwise.
47 Ibid.
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structure. By creating the potential for constitutional confrontations
of this magnitude, Article Ill has served as an ingenious device for
moderating the excesses that are associated with an independent
judiciary armed with the power of judicial review; it serves as a
sobering reminder that the Court's power ultimately depends on
maintaining the respect and goodwill of the American electorate. It is
perhaps the Court's recognition of this fact that explains why
Congress has declined to invoke this power for more than a hundied
years. So long as there is some means of assuring that the judiciary
remains ultimately accountable to the people, the argument that
judicial review is anathema to democratic precepts is difficult to
sustain.
4. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion does not take issue with the fact that
judicial review depends on the existence of a higher law which is
often susceptible to differing interpretations. Nor does it take issue
with the fact that judges effectively legislate when they select from
among several tenable interpretations. What the discussion does
dispute is the notion that true democracy and majoritarianism ae
synonymous and therefore, the institution of judicial review is devoid
of democratic legitimacy.
In truth, majoritarianism in its purist form does not exist, nor is
it likely to exist in the modem world. All modem systems of
democracy, regardless of their professed commitments to majoritarian
tenets, contain anti-majoritarian elements. This paper has strongly
urged that these elements are not mere happenstance, but in most
cases carefully measured responses to what are perceived to be the
potential excesses of majoritarian rule. To the extent that a society's
vision of democracy accords certain principles a higher priority than
the notion of majoritarian rule, the institution of judicial review is an
effective means of ensuring that those principles are respected. Indeed,
anti-majoritarian institutions may well be the only effective means of
ensuring that certain principles transcend majoritarian precepts. In
point of fact, most modem societies conceive of democracy in major-
itarian terms, tempered by anti-majoritarian institutions which are
designed to curb the excesses that are a natural by-product of
majoritarian rule-especially the tendency to abuse the rights of
minorities. Thus, if both are viewed as essential components of
democracy, it is difficult to argue that judicial review lacks
democratic legitimacy because it is anti-majoritarian in nature. To be
sure, there has never been a universally accepted definition of the
term "democratic".
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While it is true that Britain is a modem society which has thus
far rejected the institution of judicial review, it has not done so on
the basis that it lacks democratic legitimacy. This is evidenced by the
fact that British democracy contains several anti-majoritarian
components--most notably the House of Lords, a key exemption in
the Parliament Acts, and a strong two-party system buttressed by a
tradition of party loyalty which enables even the most unpopular
governments to impose their legislative will and delay electoral
accountability for up to five years. Moreover, Britain has seen fit to
export written constitutions and the power of judicial review to many
of its former colonies. Unless one is prepared to argue that this has
been a sinister plot to burden its former colonies with inherently
flawed systems of democracy, it is fair to conclude that Britain does
not regard judicial review as bereft of democratic legitimacy.
To demonstrate that judicial review is compatible with modem
notions of democracy is not to discount its potential liabilities. No
judiciary can effectively perform the task of judicial review without
the requisite degree of independence from political pressure, which
essentially requires freedom from electoral accountability. At the
same time, the judiciary must be subject to some form of
accountability, lest it will be deserving of the "super-legislature"
epithet. Thus, the task of achieving a proper balance between judicial
independence and accountability is both difficult and crucial.
Of course, the institution of judicial review depends upon the
existence of a supreme law which has an overriding effect on other
conflicting laws. If one accepts that it is doubtful that any body of
supreme law was or could be designed to provide absolute guiding
principles for the resolution of all disputes, one must also accept that
individual biases and value judgments can never be extirpated from
the process of judicial review. Indeed, constitutional interpretation
necessarily entails the task of balancing competing interests, and it is
realistic to assume that Judges will be guided by their own value
preferences in undertaking this task.
What can be accomplished is the confinement of the judiciary's
tendency to act as a super-legislature within acceptable limits. Article
III of the United States Constitution has achieved this in large
measure by granting Congress the constitutional authority to limit or
even abolish the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. This creates
the potential for a constitutional crisis of such magnitude that its
mere presence has had a profound moderating influence on both the
judicial and legislative branches. In the final analysis, Article I1
ensures that ultimate legislative authority derives from the electorate;
it serves as a remote but very effective form of judicial
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accountability. While Article III is only one means of moderating the
potential excesses of an independent judiciary armed with the power
of judicial review, it demonstrates that the task of striking a proper
balance between judicial independence and accountability is not
insuperable. The fact that Congress has not invoked this power for
more than a hundred years is an indication that the American people
are content with the balance that has been achieved.

